Iraniansforum.com, 19 Sep. 2011
سلمان صفوی، برادر رحیم صفوی فرمانده سپاه پاسداران در ملاقات خصوصی به آمریکائیان دقیقا همان چیزی را گفت که تریتا پارسی یک روز قبل به آمریکا میگفت: سپاه پاسداران را در لیست تروریستی نگذارید زیرا همکاری آمریکا با سپاه برای آرام کردن عراق به خطر میافتد. صفوی و پارسی همچنین گفتند که سپاه اکنون نقش عمده ای در ساختار رژیم دارد و تروریست خواندن آن باعث خراب شدن چشم انداز تعامل بین دو کشور خواهد گردید
چند سند تازه و مهم ویکی لیکس مربوط به دیدار سلمان صفوی، برادر رئیس سپاه پاسدان وقت رحیم صفوی با مقامات آمریکائی در لندن در تابستان 2007 منتشر شده است. در یکی از این اسناد، سلمان صفوی روز 16 اگوست 2007 با مقامات آمریکا در سفارت لندن ملاقات کرد و از آنان خواست تا از قرار دادن نام سپاه در لیست گروههای تروریستی خودداری کنند. به گفته صفوی، اینکار باعث میشود تا تلاش های آمریکا برای آرام کردن عراق و همکاری با سپاه در این زمینه شکست بخورد. به گفته صفوی، سپاه بخش مهمی از اقتصاد و ساختار قدرت را در دست دارد و تروریست خواندن آن از طرف آمریکا، راه تعامل بین دو کشور را مسدود میکند.
شگفت آنکه دقیقا یک روز قبل، تریتا پارسی در مقاله ای با همین جملات و با همین استدلال از آمریکا میخواست تا نام سپاه پاسداران در لیست تروریستی قرار نگیرد. تشابه استدلالات و جملات این دو با یک دیگر شگفت آور است.
جالب اینجاست که سلمان صفوی در این دیدار بطور آشکار بیان کننده نظرات سپاه و رژیم بوده است و تشابه اظهارات و استدلات وی با تریتا پارسی که خود را به دروغ نماینده ایرانیان در آمریکا معرفی میکند سند دیگری از تلاش های وی برای پیشبرد اهداف منطقه ای رژیم ایران و نشانه آشکاری از هماهنگی عمل بین وی با مقامات ایران میباشد.
سند ویکی لیکس
http://www.enduringamerica.com/home/2010/12/29/wikileaks-and-iran-2007-brother-of-revolutionary-guards-comm.html
O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 003175
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/16/2017
TAGS: PTER KPRP PGOV PHUM PREL BA KU IR IS UK
SUBJECT: IRAN: BROTHER OF IRGC'S SAFAVI SAYS A U.S. TERROR DESIGNATION OF IRGC WILL PRECLUDE IRAQ SECURITY COOPERATION
¶1. (C) Summary. xxxxxxxxxxxx Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) xxxxxxxxxxxx told London Iran Watcher xxxxxxxxxxxx that Iran's cooperation on security in Iraq, though not yet evident, would be forthcoming, but in the same breath argued that a U.S. terrorist designation of the IRGC would prevent any such cooperation. xxxxxxxxxxxx for the USG to hold its hand on designation came xxxxxxxxxxxx engaged with the invited group at length on Tehran's view of U.S.-Iran relations, Iraqi security, and the nuclear issue. xxxxxxxxxxxx candid remarks, which included extremely vigorous exchanges with xxxxxxxxxxxx alternated between aggressive characterizations of Iran's relations in the Persian Gulf, admissions of the IRGC's presence and role in Iraq and Afghanistan, and apparently earnest statements of Iran's desire for cooperation with the United States. xxxxxxxxxxxx appeared to pay close attention to xxxxxxxxxxxx message on need for Iran's behavior in Iraq to match its stated support for Iraqi stability and for Iran to weigh the benefits of the E3 3 incentives package and "suspension for suspension" offer which remains on the table. End Summary.
xxxxxxxxxxxx Private Plea on IRGC Designation
¶2. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx made his private plea on not designating the IRGC under U.S. law after a three-hour long larger group discussion during which xxxxxxxxxxxx had stressed that attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq by militias using Iranian-provided ordnance had actually increased from May to July, despite Iran's claim to support Iraqi stability. xxxxxxxxxxxx stated that the USG would soon see (he was vague on how soon) evidence of Iranian security cooperation in the form of diminished attacks, taking the July discussions in Baghdad -- as opposed to those held in May -- as the point at which the IRGC had decided it could go forward with such cooperation. xxxxxxxxxxxx described how IRGC orders to "our allies" are "in the pipeline," but it takes time for such orders to be disseminated throughout Iraqi militia networks and acted upon ("it is a very large machine, with delayed effect").
¶3. (C) By way of illustration of this delayed implementation phenomenon, xxxxxxxxxxxx said there had been an unintended attack "by our (Shiite Iraqi) allies" on UK forces immediately after the release of the UK naval hostages last April. xxxxxxxxxxxx said the IRGC had indeed issued an order for attacks on UK forces, in response to what he called an earlier UK attack on the Iranian consulate in Basra, but that Iranian expression of unhappiness had been satisfied with the hostage episode, and that IRGC authorities were consequently exasperated by the militia attack occuring shortly after the hostage resolution. xxxxxxxxxxxx said their Iraqi "allies" explained the incident as the result of a standing "general order" to launch such attacks, which had not yet been rescinded. xxxxxxxxxxxx indicated that similar organizational snafus lie behind the current continuing attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq.
¶4. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx went on to argue, however, that a USG designation of the IRGC as a terrorist organization would effectively end all interest, or political ability, of the IRGC to cooperate with the USG on Iraqi or Afghan security. He stressed that, unlike "a few years ago, under Khatami," the IRGC plays a central and preeminent role in the Iranian government and that, if the IRGC is designated as a terrorist organization, the USG will have no Iranian partner with which to engage on security or other issues of mutual concern. xxxxxxxxxxxx said it makes no difference to Iran whether the proposed IRGC designation is done under U.S. domestic law or international authority -- all sanctions, financial measures and designations are seen by Iranian authorities and the public as authored by America, with international partners such as the E3 plus 3 and the UN as mere cutouts for U.S. initiatives. The practical effects of such measures are unimportant to the Iranian Government, but the symbolic and psychological consequences do matter.
Group Discussion Highlights
¶5. (C) The evening's larger group discussion had several highlights:
-- A (surprising) degree of self-professed confusion by xxxxxxxxxxxx at the what he called the "multiple and conflicting signals" on Iran policy from various parts of the USG including the Congress;
-- An open acknowledgment by xxxxxxxxxxxx that the IRGC is present and operating in both Afghanistan and Iraq (with U.S. occupation and Sunni attacks on Shias given as a justification);
-- xxxxxxxxxxxx description of Shiite militias in Iraq as "our allies, whom we created against Saddam;"
-- Fiery statements by xxxxxxxxxxxx on U.S. injustices perpetrated over the years against Iran, on Iran's resolve and capabilities to launch military and asymmetric responses, and on how Iran should replace or join with the United States as the Gulf region's "co-manager," all of which provoked vehement rejoinders from xxxxxxxxxxxx;
-- xxxxxxxxxxxx reflections on a more mature Iran's no-longer-revolutionary approach to its foreign relations;
-- xxxxxxxxxxxx repeated return to the theme of desiring a constructive and cooperative relationship with the U.S., first on Afghanistan and Iraq and secondly on the nuclear issue;
-- xxxxxxxxxxxx near-gloating remarks on Hezbollah's 2006 conflict with Israel; and
-- xxxxxxxxxxxx description of the United States as having become Iran's "hostage" in Iraq ("you cannot stay and you cannot leave ... your forces there and in the region are our target").
Comment
¶6. (C) Although impeccably turned out, outwardly genial, and speaking with confidence and an evident sense of authority, xxxxxxxxxxxx appeared to be under significant stress and at great pains to listen carefully and closely to all interlocutors, and especially to xxxxxxxxxxxx (standard) comments on the E3 plus 3 offer, as well as the need for Iranian behavior change in Iraq. xxxxxxxxxxxx apparently genuine desire to engage and move towards cooperation was coupled to his equally apparent sense that Iran is entitled to use violent means against us until such time as there a change in the USG's "regional behavior."
Trita Parsi's declaration:
http://niac.convio.net/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5710&security=1&news_iv_ctrl=-1
NIAC Memo: Terror Label for Guard Corp Entrenches US-Iran Enmity
Tuesday, August 14, 2007
By: Dr. Trita Parsi - Analysis
Download PDF version:
The White House's decision to designate the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps as a terrorist organization could deal a double blow to efforts to utilize diplomacy with Iran to stabilize Iraq. Not only does the designation risk undermining the important yet limited talks between the United States and Iran in Baghdad, but it may also negatively impact the next U.S. president's ability to seek diplomacy with Iran by further entrenching U.S.-Iran relations in a paradigm of enmity.
The Washington Post and New York Times reported Tuesday that the Bush administration is going to designate the Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Iran's 125,000-strong elite military branch, as a "specially designated global terrorist" under Executive Order 13224, due to the organization's alleged destabilizing activities in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East. The designation would authorize the United States to target the IRGC's business dealings, including blocking its assets. Originally set up by the ruling clergy in Iran as a parallel army to prevent the regular Iranian army from orchestrating a military coup against the revolutionary government, the Guards are widely considered to be a powerful political force in Iran with close ties to the country's conservative factions. The Guards have heavily penetrated Iran's economy, including some of its key industries. They are often accused of behaving like a state-sponsored mafia, with a corrupting influence on Iran's economy, police, media, industries, judiciary and government. As such, many Iranians find the power and political influence of this paramilitary force highly problematic. Some Iranian political activists have warned that any swift political change in Iran will likely benefit the Guards rather than the pro-democracy movement precisely because the IRGC is well equipped and highly organized. The Bush administration's decision to label the Guards as a global terrorist organization has been presented as a step to ratchet up pressure on Iran and intensify efforts to financially isolate the country. Yet, it is unclear whether the designation is necessary to target the Guards economically. The U.S. Treasury is already engaged in an extensive campaign to dry up Iran's sources of finance. Whether the Guards are labeled a terrorist organization or not will likely have little bearing on that campaign. Nor is the decision likely to have a decisive impact on the IRGC's shady business
سلمان صفوی، برادر رحیم صفوی فرمانده سپاه پاسداران در ملاقات خصوصی به آمریکائیان دقیقا همان چیزی را گفت که تریتا پارسی یک روز قبل به آمریکا میگفت: سپاه پاسداران را در لیست تروریستی نگذارید زیرا همکاری آمریکا با سپاه برای آرام کردن عراق به خطر میافتد. صفوی و پارسی همچنین گفتند که سپاه اکنون نقش عمده ای در ساختار رژیم دارد و تروریست خواندن آن باعث خراب شدن چشم انداز تعامل بین دو کشور خواهد گردید
چند سند تازه و مهم ویکی لیکس مربوط به دیدار سلمان صفوی، برادر رئیس سپاه پاسدان وقت رحیم صفوی با مقامات آمریکائی در لندن در تابستان 2007 منتشر شده است. در یکی از این اسناد، سلمان صفوی روز 16 اگوست 2007 با مقامات آمریکا در سفارت لندن ملاقات کرد و از آنان خواست تا از قرار دادن نام سپاه در لیست گروههای تروریستی خودداری کنند. به گفته صفوی، اینکار باعث میشود تا تلاش های آمریکا برای آرام کردن عراق و همکاری با سپاه در این زمینه شکست بخورد. به گفته صفوی، سپاه بخش مهمی از اقتصاد و ساختار قدرت را در دست دارد و تروریست خواندن آن از طرف آمریکا، راه تعامل بین دو کشور را مسدود میکند.
شگفت آنکه دقیقا یک روز قبل، تریتا پارسی در مقاله ای با همین جملات و با همین استدلال از آمریکا میخواست تا نام سپاه پاسداران در لیست تروریستی قرار نگیرد. تشابه استدلالات و جملات این دو با یک دیگر شگفت آور است.
جالب اینجاست که سلمان صفوی در این دیدار بطور آشکار بیان کننده نظرات سپاه و رژیم بوده است و تشابه اظهارات و استدلات وی با تریتا پارسی که خود را به دروغ نماینده ایرانیان در آمریکا معرفی میکند سند دیگری از تلاش های وی برای پیشبرد اهداف منطقه ای رژیم ایران و نشانه آشکاری از هماهنگی عمل بین وی با مقامات ایران میباشد.
سند ویکی لیکس
http://www.enduringamerica.com/home/2010/12/29/wikileaks-and-iran-2007-brother-of-revolutionary-guards-comm.html
O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 003175
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/16/2017
TAGS: PTER KPRP PGOV PHUM PREL BA KU IR IS UK
SUBJECT: IRAN: BROTHER OF IRGC'S SAFAVI SAYS A U.S. TERROR DESIGNATION OF IRGC WILL PRECLUDE IRAQ SECURITY COOPERATION
¶1. (C) Summary. xxxxxxxxxxxx Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) xxxxxxxxxxxx told London Iran Watcher xxxxxxxxxxxx that Iran's cooperation on security in Iraq, though not yet evident, would be forthcoming, but in the same breath argued that a U.S. terrorist designation of the IRGC would prevent any such cooperation. xxxxxxxxxxxx for the USG to hold its hand on designation came xxxxxxxxxxxx engaged with the invited group at length on Tehran's view of U.S.-Iran relations, Iraqi security, and the nuclear issue. xxxxxxxxxxxx candid remarks, which included extremely vigorous exchanges with xxxxxxxxxxxx alternated between aggressive characterizations of Iran's relations in the Persian Gulf, admissions of the IRGC's presence and role in Iraq and Afghanistan, and apparently earnest statements of Iran's desire for cooperation with the United States. xxxxxxxxxxxx appeared to pay close attention to xxxxxxxxxxxx message on need for Iran's behavior in Iraq to match its stated support for Iraqi stability and for Iran to weigh the benefits of the E3 3 incentives package and "suspension for suspension" offer which remains on the table. End Summary.
xxxxxxxxxxxx Private Plea on IRGC Designation
¶2. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx made his private plea on not designating the IRGC under U.S. law after a three-hour long larger group discussion during which xxxxxxxxxxxx had stressed that attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq by militias using Iranian-provided ordnance had actually increased from May to July, despite Iran's claim to support Iraqi stability. xxxxxxxxxxxx stated that the USG would soon see (he was vague on how soon) evidence of Iranian security cooperation in the form of diminished attacks, taking the July discussions in Baghdad -- as opposed to those held in May -- as the point at which the IRGC had decided it could go forward with such cooperation. xxxxxxxxxxxx described how IRGC orders to "our allies" are "in the pipeline," but it takes time for such orders to be disseminated throughout Iraqi militia networks and acted upon ("it is a very large machine, with delayed effect").
¶3. (C) By way of illustration of this delayed implementation phenomenon, xxxxxxxxxxxx said there had been an unintended attack "by our (Shiite Iraqi) allies" on UK forces immediately after the release of the UK naval hostages last April. xxxxxxxxxxxx said the IRGC had indeed issued an order for attacks on UK forces, in response to what he called an earlier UK attack on the Iranian consulate in Basra, but that Iranian expression of unhappiness had been satisfied with the hostage episode, and that IRGC authorities were consequently exasperated by the militia attack occuring shortly after the hostage resolution. xxxxxxxxxxxx said their Iraqi "allies" explained the incident as the result of a standing "general order" to launch such attacks, which had not yet been rescinded. xxxxxxxxxxxx indicated that similar organizational snafus lie behind the current continuing attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq.
¶4. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx went on to argue, however, that a USG designation of the IRGC as a terrorist organization would effectively end all interest, or political ability, of the IRGC to cooperate with the USG on Iraqi or Afghan security. He stressed that, unlike "a few years ago, under Khatami," the IRGC plays a central and preeminent role in the Iranian government and that, if the IRGC is designated as a terrorist organization, the USG will have no Iranian partner with which to engage on security or other issues of mutual concern. xxxxxxxxxxxx said it makes no difference to Iran whether the proposed IRGC designation is done under U.S. domestic law or international authority -- all sanctions, financial measures and designations are seen by Iranian authorities and the public as authored by America, with international partners such as the E3 plus 3 and the UN as mere cutouts for U.S. initiatives. The practical effects of such measures are unimportant to the Iranian Government, but the symbolic and psychological consequences do matter.
Group Discussion Highlights
¶5. (C) The evening's larger group discussion had several highlights:
-- A (surprising) degree of self-professed confusion by xxxxxxxxxxxx at the what he called the "multiple and conflicting signals" on Iran policy from various parts of the USG including the Congress;
-- An open acknowledgment by xxxxxxxxxxxx that the IRGC is present and operating in both Afghanistan and Iraq (with U.S. occupation and Sunni attacks on Shias given as a justification);
-- xxxxxxxxxxxx description of Shiite militias in Iraq as "our allies, whom we created against Saddam;"
-- Fiery statements by xxxxxxxxxxxx on U.S. injustices perpetrated over the years against Iran, on Iran's resolve and capabilities to launch military and asymmetric responses, and on how Iran should replace or join with the United States as the Gulf region's "co-manager," all of which provoked vehement rejoinders from xxxxxxxxxxxx;
-- xxxxxxxxxxxx reflections on a more mature Iran's no-longer-revolutionary approach to its foreign relations;
-- xxxxxxxxxxxx repeated return to the theme of desiring a constructive and cooperative relationship with the U.S., first on Afghanistan and Iraq and secondly on the nuclear issue;
-- xxxxxxxxxxxx near-gloating remarks on Hezbollah's 2006 conflict with Israel; and
-- xxxxxxxxxxxx description of the United States as having become Iran's "hostage" in Iraq ("you cannot stay and you cannot leave ... your forces there and in the region are our target").
Comment
¶6. (C) Although impeccably turned out, outwardly genial, and speaking with confidence and an evident sense of authority, xxxxxxxxxxxx appeared to be under significant stress and at great pains to listen carefully and closely to all interlocutors, and especially to xxxxxxxxxxxx (standard) comments on the E3 plus 3 offer, as well as the need for Iranian behavior change in Iraq. xxxxxxxxxxxx apparently genuine desire to engage and move towards cooperation was coupled to his equally apparent sense that Iran is entitled to use violent means against us until such time as there a change in the USG's "regional behavior."
Trita Parsi's declaration:
http://niac.convio.net/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5710&security=1&news_iv_ctrl=-1
NIAC Memo: Terror Label for Guard Corp Entrenches US-Iran Enmity
Tuesday, August 14, 2007
By: Dr. Trita Parsi - Analysis
Download PDF version:
The White House's decision to designate the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps as a terrorist organization could deal a double blow to efforts to utilize diplomacy with Iran to stabilize Iraq. Not only does the designation risk undermining the important yet limited talks between the United States and Iran in Baghdad, but it may also negatively impact the next U.S. president's ability to seek diplomacy with Iran by further entrenching U.S.-Iran relations in a paradigm of enmity.
The Washington Post and New York Times reported Tuesday that the Bush administration is going to designate the Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Iran's 125,000-strong elite military branch, as a "specially designated global terrorist" under Executive Order 13224, due to the organization's alleged destabilizing activities in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East. The designation would authorize the United States to target the IRGC's business dealings, including blocking its assets. Originally set up by the ruling clergy in Iran as a parallel army to prevent the regular Iranian army from orchestrating a military coup against the revolutionary government, the Guards are widely considered to be a powerful political force in Iran with close ties to the country's conservative factions. The Guards have heavily penetrated Iran's economy, including some of its key industries. They are often accused of behaving like a state-sponsored mafia, with a corrupting influence on Iran's economy, police, media, industries, judiciary and government. As such, many Iranians find the power and political influence of this paramilitary force highly problematic. Some Iranian political activists have warned that any swift political change in Iran will likely benefit the Guards rather than the pro-democracy movement precisely because the IRGC is well equipped and highly organized. The Bush administration's decision to label the Guards as a global terrorist organization has been presented as a step to ratchet up pressure on Iran and intensify efforts to financially isolate the country. Yet, it is unclear whether the designation is necessary to target the Guards economically. The U.S. Treasury is already engaged in an extensive campaign to dry up Iran's sources of finance. Whether the Guards are labeled a terrorist organization or not will likely have little bearing on that campaign. Nor is the decision likely to have a decisive impact on the IRGC's shady business
